Inconsistency in Conceptual Metaphor Theory

What is it about?

One of the most important methodological principles which any kind of scientific inquiry must follow is the principle of non-contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction says that a certain statement cannot be true and false at the same time. However, during the past few decades the evaluation of contradictions arising in scientific theorizing has changed radically. One of the new insights is that there are different types of contradictions with different functions in scientific inquiry. Further, logics and methodologies have been developed which tolerate contradictions among certain circumstances and to a certain extent. _x000D_ The paper investigates the nature of contradictions in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory. Against the background of the developments mentioned above, the aim of the present paper is to raise and to answer the following question: What kinds of inconsistencies emerge in conceptual metaphor theory and how should they be evaluated? _x000D_ The paper proposes an answer to this question which says, first, that in the conceptual metaphor theory there are four different kinds of contradiction which have different functions. Second, there is a complex process of the emergence and the resolution of contradictions. Third, the emergence of different types of contradictions motivates the improvement of the theory in different ways and in this sense plays a constructive role in its evolution. _x000D_

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