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How might the laws of war be constituted by gender categories? I argue that this constitution occurs not only through the regulation of war's internal categories, but through its the very nature and, in particular, a foregrounding of masculinity as the gender of reference. This then makes it possible to disparage and marginalize contending conceptions of the regulation of war that do not measure up to the "restrained masculinity" consensus. The point is not only that is consensus is dominant but also that it displays remarkable staying power over time. I argue that some of the secret of that persistence is linked to the regulation of war's consistent reliance on racial tropes, underlying misogyny and monopolization of expertise.

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This page is a summary of: Another Look at the Gendered Constitution of the Laws of War, Journal of International Humanitarian Legal Studies, June 2023, Brill,
DOI: 10.1163/18781527-bja10077.
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