What is it about?
Following the July 2013 military coup in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood became more fragmented. This article depends on first-hand sources to explain the debate that ensued within the brotherhood about its strategy and leadership legitimacy that led to this organizational rift between what we call in the article, the pacifists and revolutionists. We also discuss the revolutionary camp's involvement, if any, in the violent activities that took place in Egypt after the coup.
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Why is it important?
Unlike other published articles that aim to illustrate the rift within the brotherhood, this article relies on tens of statements issued by the revolutionary camp to trace the reasons for the split within the brotherhood and its organizational consequences. Further, the findings of the article show that the revolutionists within the brotherhood advocated for the use of violent means against the el-Sis regime under the notions of qisas, retaliation, and self-defense.
Perspectives
The article is unique in two ways: First, it relies on its analysis and findings on documents published by both camps within the brotherhood (the traditional leadership and the new emerging revolutionary leadership). Second, it explains for the first time the strategy of the revolutionists to topple the el-Sisi regime.
Mohammad Yaghi
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung eV
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Organizational Rifts within Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Question of Violence, Middle East Law and Governance, April 2022, Brill,
DOI: 10.1163/18763375-20221217.
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