Aristotle, De Anima 1.3, 406b2 κατὰ τὸ σῶµα

What is it about?

This submitted manuscript is concerned with Aristotle’s assertation at De anima 406b1–3 that the soul is subject to the same motion to which the body is subject, particularly regarding the phrase at 406b2 κατὰ τὸ σῶμα. This passage is important for Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s theory of the soul’s self-motion and has been long resistant to interpretation. It has been discussed by H. Bonitz (Hermes 7, 1873) and H. de Ley (CQ 20, 1970), both of whom have impact on contemporary scholarship: Bonitz’s suggestion to emend the Greek text has been followed not only by W.D. Ross in his widely used 1956 OCT edition, but also by C. Shields in his 2016 translation and commentary in Clarendon Aristotle Series, while de Ley’s suggestion to translate κατὰ τὸ σῶμα as ‘throughout the body’ rather than the conventional translation (‘in accordance with the body’) is defended by R. Polansky’s in his critical commentary on De an. (CUP, 2007). In this paper I shall argue that the traditional reading is still defendable without emending the text. By clarifying Aristotle’s specific notion of the sameness and the argument’s context, I shall show that the difficulties raised by Bonitz and de Ley can be solved. It is hoped that the results of this article will aid in constructing Aristotle’s argument and the future critical editing of the De an., a very obscure and badly transmitted treatise.

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