What is it about?

Forced execution exposes hidden payloads in malware by enforcing the outcomes of conditional transfer instructions. But commercial virtualization obfuscators turn native instructions into virtual bytecode, hiding native conditional transfers and defeating conventional forced execution. We show that full deobfuscation is unnecessary: by locating and manipulating the instructions responsible for virtualized conditional transfers, we can enforce outcomes in the original conditional transfers.

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Why is it important?

Our work is unique and timely because modern malware increasingly uses commercial virtualization obfuscators (e.g., VMProtect, Themida, Enigma, Obsidium), which turn native instructions into customized virtual bytecode and hide native control transfers, rendering conventional forced execution largely ineffective. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first forced execution work capable of circumventing commercial virtualization obfuscation. Rather than requiring comprehensive deobfuscation, we design a novel algorithm that identifies and manipulates conditional control transfer in the virtualized code, relying only on weak assumptions and generalizing to popular commercial virtualization obfuscators. We implement a prototype system and show that it accurately identifies obfuscated conditional transfers and effectively exposes hidden malware behaviors obfuscated by virtualization.

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This page is a summary of: Forced Execution for Malware Protected by Commercial Virtualization Obfuscators, November 2026, ACM (Association for Computing Machinery),
DOI: 10.1145/3830454.3832741.
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