What is it about?
The rapid evolution of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) has heightened the cyber vulnerability of modern vehicles, transforming them from isolated mechanical entities to complex interconnected systems. This paper bridges the existing gaps in the formalization of cyber attacks on ITS, extending common frameworks, like MITRE ATT&CK, to encompass the unique challenges of the automotive and rail sectors. We introduce a multi-modal approach grounded in real-world events, exploring the implications of new technologies in ITS and the convergence of IT and OT security in transportation. Our VATT&EK framework, leveraging the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) approach, offers a structured categorization of adversarial tactics and techniques, aiding in systematic threat pinpointing and prioritization. This not only guides the formulation of vehicle specifications but also informs penetration testing procedures and real-time threat detection capabilities. By providing a common language and taxonomy for discussing vehicle-related cyber threats, our work fosters collaboration among researchers, manufacturers, and security professionals, ensuring strengthened security postures in tandem with vehicular technological advancements.
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Why is it important?
The formalization and categorization of cyber attacks into distinct phases, as presented in this paper, offer a structured approach to understanding and mitigating threats in the realm of ITS. By segmenting attacks, such as "Initial Access" which encompasses all vectors allowing an attacker entry into a vehicle, we can derive specific defensive strategies tailored to each phase. Understanding the techniques within the "Affect in Vehicle Functions" category, which pertains to all methods influencing vehicle control, is crucial for ensuring only authorized entities can alter vehicle behavior. This framework not only guides the formulation of general requirements for vehicle specifications, ensuring that security considerations are embedded from the design phase, but also informs penetration testing procedures, providing a roadmap for ethical hackers to assess vehicle vulnerabilities. By understanding the various techniques, security professionals can develop detection mechanisms that map directly to these techniques, enhancing real-time threat detection capabilities. Additionally, in the event of a security breach, incident responders can utilize this framework to analyze and map the attack to specific techniques, facilitating quicker mitigation and recovery. Beyond these immediate applications, the framework enriches the cyber security community by providing a common language and taxonomy for discussing and addressing vehicle-related cyber threats. It fosters collaboration among researchers, manufacturers, and security professionals. As vehicular technologies evolve, this work ensures that their security postures are strengthened in tandem, contributing to the creation of safer, more resilient transportation ecosystems that benefit both industry stakeholders and the general public.
Perspectives
This paper seeks to provide a robust framework for understanding and addressing cyber threats in the ITS domain. By integrating insights from both the automotive and rail sectors and aligning them with contemporary technological trends, with the aim to offer a comprehensive toolset for stakeholders to safeguard the future of transportation.
Dominik Spychalski
INCYDE industrial cyber defense GmbH
While vehicles used to be isolated entities, they are now part of a complex ecosystem. We need a uniform taxonomy to describe the threats to intelligent transportation systems in order to derive suitable measures. This is precisely why we developed VATT&EK.
Ali Recai Yekta
Yekta IT GmbH
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: VATT&EK: Formalization of Cyber Attacks on Intelligent Transport Systems - a TTP based approach for Automotive and Rail, December 2023, ACM (Association for Computing Machinery),
DOI: 10.1145/3631204.3631867.
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