What is it about?
When is it possible to reassign students to schools to improve diversity at schools while improving student welfare? We construct a method to assign students to schools that improves diversity at schools while assigning students to either their initial schools or more-preferred ones. Our method produces efficient allocations and cannot be gamed by students. Our results can be applied to other matching markets. For example, teachers need to be assigned to schools, doctors to hospitals, and workers to firms. We provide a class of distributional objectives, such as diversity, for which our method can be applied. The class is based on a permissive notion of discrete concavity that we introduce.
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Why is it important?
Diversity is deemed highly desirable in many environments such as labor markets and school choice. However, there is a lacuna about how to achieve diversity while improving the welfare of the participating agents. We provide a ready-to-use method that can be adopted by policymakers in school districts, worker and student exchange markets, and medical residency programs. Our method can be easily used to address various distributional objectives including those related to diversity. Moreover, the new concavity notion of functions on discrete domains may be of independent interest, as it is reminiscent of, but different from, standard concepts in discrete convex analysis.
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This page is a summary of: Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives, July 2023, ACM (Association for Computing Machinery),
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597716.
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