What is it about?

The idea that particular legal institutions are artifacts is not new. However, the idea that 'law' or 'legal system' itself is an artifact has seldom, due perhaps to the ambiguities sorrounding philosophical inquires into law, been directly expressed. Nevertheless, such an idea has recently been more often invoked, though not always developed in greater detail with regard to the questions of what the claim that 'law' or 'legal system' is an artifact, in fact, ontologically entails and what consequences, if any, this claim has for philosophical accounts of law. Therefore, the primary aim of this paper is to attempt an inquiry into what the claim that 'law' by its nature or character is an artifact entails and what an artifact theory of law might look like.

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This page is a summary of: Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?, Ratio Juris, August 2016, Wiley,
DOI: 10.1111/raju.12134.
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