An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

What is it about?

We analyze the effect of election promises on electoral behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, politicians can make nonbinding election promises about how to split an endowment between themselves and the group. We find that promises affect both what voters belief and how they vote. Voters prefer higher promises up to certain point from which the credibility of a promise decreases. The actual contributions of politicians relate to their promises in a similar pattern. Generally, the election promises are credible unless particularly high. Politicians keep promises more often if a reelection is possible and if the politician came into power by vote rather than by a lottery. Voters reward high contributions in the previous period and punish promise breaking even after controlling for the contribution in the previous period or voters' beliefs about future contributions. Our results suggest that voters both use promises for forward-looking voting and punish broken promises in restrospect.

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