The Conceivability-To-Possibility Entailment: How It Does (Not) Work

What is it about?

In the paper, I discuss the problem of the efficiency of conceivability arguments for metaphysical possibility, with a focus on David Chalmers’ conceivability argument for the logical possibility of phenomenal zombies (as part of the zombie argument against materialism). I argue that Chalmers’ accounts of the CP entailment fail because of circularity, and reconsider the gravest problems with the CP entailment. An argument is made that “conceivability” works as a success term, and the judgment of conceivability cannot be made independently of the judgment of logical coherence (no a priori contradiction), which, by definition, is the same as the judgment of logical possibility. The conclusion is that although, in a sense, conceivability does entail possibility, this entailment boils down to logical possibility entailing itself. Therefore, it is not helpful for any substantial argument. Nevertheless, there are some points in the vicinity that seem good candidates to survive the collapse of the CP enterprise and may ground the re-construal and defense of some of the arguments formerly grounded in CP.

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