Philosophical theories of vagueness differ in how well they account for intersex athletes

What is it about?

Sex determines much about one’s life, but what determines one’s sex? The answer is complicated and incomplete: on close examination, ordinary notions of female and male are vague--the categories don't have sharp boundaries. In 2012, the International Olympic Committee further specified what it means by ‘woman’ in response to questions about who, exactly, is eligible to compete in women’s Olympic events. I argue, first, that their definition of 'woman' is evidence that the use of vague terms is better described by semantic approaches to vagueness than by epistemic approaches. In addition, the IOC’s 2012 stipulation was made with sensitivity to its practical consequences. Linguistic actions often have morally relevant consequences, and I contend that, other things equal, we should adopt theories about language that acknowledge the responsibility we bear for what we say. Taking vagueness to be an epistemic phenomenon precludes the sense of agency needed for moral responsibility; taking it to be semantic does not. Thus I advance two arguments for semantic approaches to vagueness, as against epistemic approaches: one descriptive and one normative.

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Why is it important?

As popular understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality gain nuance, the socially created crisis of intersex conditions will continue attracting more attention. This article proposes a morally responsible way of understanding the vagueness of sex and gender, one that takes intersex people as they are instead of attempting to wedge them into a gender binary that does not fit. This may be of interest to many people who are concerned about issues relating to sex, gender, and justice. For philosophers of language, what is most radical about this article is that it suggests that moral considerations may enter into one's considerations when choosing a philosophical theory about language. Theories in the philosophy of language typically aim only at descriptive accuracy. But such theories are not always morally neutral in their practical effects, and so there is room for moral considerations to play a decisive role when choosing among theories that are similarly empirically adequate.