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Habermas claims in his Discourse Ethics that moral norms (norms of justice) are based on "universalizable interests" but does not say anything about the structure of universalizability. He also says that valid norms are "equally good for all" or in the equal interest of all". By making a distinction between collective and distributive universalisability, I fill in some of the missing detail, and on the basis of this I challenge some of the further claims that Habermas makes about what kind of justification moral norms require.

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This page is a summary of: What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?, Journal of Political Philosophy, December 2002, Wiley,
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9760.00112.
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