What is it about?
Conducting negotiations requires much skill that can be honed with experience and the right way of thinking. While leaders may think that their involvement is crucial, to the extent that their mere being in the room would yield success, this perception is wrong. Success in negotiation increases when negotiators undergo comprehensive training in diplomacy. Negotiators need to be assisted by specialists for specific issues. The team should include lawyers, military professionals, mapping experts, historians, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists and media specialists. While all these experts cannot and should not be in the negotiation room, they should be accessible and ready to support the negotiations as they proceed. One person, intelligent and capable as this person might be, might not possess all the qualities needed for success.
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Why is it important?
This article aims to outline the keys to successful negotiations, mediation and facilitation. Its insights are the result of many years of research and peace activity. The writing has benefited greatly from in-depth interviews. These insights will be useful when another opportunity to resolve the conflict presents itself. With these insights, hopefully, the next opportunity will not be missed.
Perspectives
The research for this article is based on thirteen years of research. This study examines the Israeli–Palestinian peace process from the signing of the Oslo Accords (1993) to the present, while situating the negotiations within their broader diplomatic antecedents, including the Egyptian–Israeli negotiations culminating in the 1978 Camp David Accords. The purpose is both historical and analytical: to reconstruct decision-making processes and to derive generalisable insights regarding mediation, facilitation, and negotiated conflict termination. The research proceeded in four complementary stages. I. Literature Review and Documentary Contextualisation The first stage consisted of extensive preliminary research in academic libraries and digital repositories. I surveyed the relevant scholarly literature, including memoirs and autobiographies of negotiators, diplomatic histories, government publications, journal articles, and contemporaneous media reporting. The documentary corpus includes the principal diplomatic initiatives and negotiation frameworks of the peace process: the Oslo Accords (1993), the Stockholm channel (1996), the Wye River Memorandum (1998), the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (1999), the Harpsund talks (2000), the Camp David Summit (2000), the Clinton Parameters (2000), the Taba negotiations (2001), the Arab Peace Initiative (2002), Israel’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza (2005), the Annapolis process (2007), the Olmert–Abbas negotiations (2006–2008), the Kerry initiative (2013–2014), and the Trump Peace Plan and Abraham Accords (2020). The purpose of this phase was historiographical: to map areas of consensus and disagreement within the existing scholarship and to identify evidentiary gaps requiring primary-source investigation. II. Archival Research The second stage involved archival research conducted in several major repositories: The National Archives (London), the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (King’s College London), the Israel State Archives, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive, the Norwegian Nobel Institute, and the Library of Congress. Archival materials are particularly valuable in diplomatic history because they provide contemporaneous records of policy formation, revealing internal debates, bureaucratic constraints, and decision-making rationales not visible in retrospective narratives (Trachtenberg, 2009). In several instances, archival documents clarified discrepancies between later memoir accounts and real-time governmental assessments. Other important primary sources are the Palestine Papers, which shed important light on Palestinian views in real time, as negotiations were taking place. These papers are documents from the negotiation office of the Palestine Authority. They were leaked and published by al-Jazeera and The Guardian, as well as individuals like Akram Hanieh (2001) and Clayton Swisher (2011). III. Elite Interviews and Oral History The third and central stage of the project consists of semi-structured elite interviews with negotiators, mediators, and policymakers. Elite interviewing is a well-established qualitative method in political science and diplomatic history because many key decisions occur in informal settings that leave limited written records (Dexter, 1970). Interviews are a valuable method for gathering information and uncovering new evidence (King et al, 2019). I conducted more than one hundred in-depth interviews and discussions (see Appendix I: Interviewees) with participants from Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Norway, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the United Nations. Interviewees included heads of government, ministers, senior diplomats, mediators, and negotiators. Multiple participants were directly involved in the Camp David 2000 summit and the Taba negotiations, and several participated in the 1978 Camp David negotiations. Most interviews were conducted face-to-face, either in the interviewees' offices or in neutral locations like coffee shops, hotels, and restaurants. Some interviews were conducted remotely via video technology while others took place in my office. Interviews averaged approximately two hours and, in some cases, were conducted in multiple sessions. I began with a general list of questions and allowed interviewees to digress based on their interests and concerns (Appendix II: General Questionnaire). I took extensive notes and recorded the interviews, which were later transcribed and authorized by the interviewees for analysis. Interviewees signed informed-consent forms. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and returned to participants for authorisation prior to analysis. Data were securely stored on university servers with off-site backup. The interviews are treated not as personal testimonies alone but as historical evidence. Oral history enables access to perceptions, motivations, and informal interactions that are often absent from official documentation (Perks and Thomson, 2015). They reveal not a single linear narrative but multiple competing interpretations of the same events, what historians sometimes call a “Rashomon effect” in historical memory. IV. Triangulation and Analytical Method The study adopts methodological triangulation. Interview evidence was systematically cross-checked against other interviews, archival records, contemporaneous media coverage, and secondary scholarship. Triangulation is essential in qualitative political research to mitigate problems of selective memory, retrospective rationalisation, and self-presentation bias (George and Bennett, 2005). I explicitly recognise limitations inherent in elite interviewing. Interviews occurred years after many events; participants sometimes misremembered sequences or dates, engaged in hindsight reasoning, or emphasised their own roles. For this reason, no single interview is treated as authoritative. Rather, reliability was assessed through corroboration across independent sources.
Professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor
University College London
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Do's and Don'ts in Peace Negotiations: Learning From the Arab‐Israeli Peace Negotiations, Peace and Change, August 2026, Wiley,
DOI: 10.1111/pech.70090.
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