What is it about?

Laboratory experiments are used to study the frequency and speed of settlement when litigants are exposed to different information environments. Asymmetry information is found significantly to delay settlement relative to symmetry information. Observed settlement behavior matches some, but not all, predictions of a popular economic model of negotiation delay and impasse in the presence of asymmetry information.

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Why is it important?

Protracted delays before litigants settle disputes are a source of almost pure economic waste. A better understanding of why litigants take so long to settle could lead to the development of individual behavioral strategies and systematic reforms to greatly increase the efficiency of dispute resolution.

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This page is a summary of: Why Wait to Settle? An Experimental Test of the Asymmetric-Information Hypothesis, The Journal of Law and Economics, August 2016, University of Chicago Press,
DOI: 10.1086/689704.
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