What is it about?
This article explores the relevance of Heidegger’s existential philosophy for person-centered and experiential therapies. Of particular interest is Heidegger’s concept of mood in the context of Gendlin’s bodily-experiential therapy and how Heidegger’s philosophy can enhance our understanding of an authentic potentiality-for-being and the vulnerability and finitude of our existence. The latter part of this article, however, addresses concerns regarding Heidegger’s ontological concepts of being-with-others and solicitude that privilege mood and primordial familiarity over the therapeutic attitude of empathy. In recent medical/philosophical literature, the curative role of empathy has been either ignored or defined as mainly a cognitive and instrumental skill that is dependent upon (a) medical knowledge and (b) a desirable moral and professional attitude of compassion to enable the management of emotional and subjective experiencing in complex relationships. Implications for person-centered and experiential therapies in medicalized mental health care systems are discussed.
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Why is it important?
This article compares the ontological thinking of Daseinsanalysis (based on Heidegger) and person-centred therapy (Rogers and also Gendlin) and argues that both perspectives while distinct can be useful. I argue how person-centered therapy remains relevant without needing to compare it to more directive (eg, CBT) therapies.
Perspectives
Heidegger and Carl Rogers may at first seem like an odd pairing. They had little in common. But my underlying premise is that Heidegger’s thinking, like other existential schools of thought, may have the beneficial effect of prompting person-centered and experiential therapists to question their implicit beliefs and assumptions
Dr Ross Crisp
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Being person-centered and Heidegger’s sense of “being”: a discussion, Person-Centered & Experiential Psychotherapies, April 2015, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/14779757.2015.1020564.
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