What is it about?
This article criticizes Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy but turning its central maneuver on its head. If Kant elucidates subjectivity as the condition for the possibility of experience, what he calls the transcendental, then what are the conditions of this condition, what are the conditions of the transcendental? I argue that transcendental conditions are thus consequent upon the brute givenness of being, that for which there are no conditions, that which can only be narrated as given without a preceding explanation.
Featured Image
Why is it important?
This article ultimately hints at an alternative to Quentin Meillassoux's critique of Kant as a correlationist. While Meillassoux's critique of Kant leads him to espouse the necessity of contingency, I rather think that a more penetrating critique of Kant should lead to the contingency of necessity. The conditions necessary for the experience of being are, considered in themselves, contingent rather than necessary.
Perspectives
I think that this article follows a current trend that is critical of Kant. But, most of the current critiques of Kant critique him from the outside, whereas this criticism does not reject Kant's central position of transcendental subjectivity as such, but it works from within this system to show how transcendental subjectivity cannot be the absolute a priori as it is rather consequent upon being. It is something posterior rather than absolutely prior.
Tyler Tritten
Gonzaga University
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: AGAINST KANT, Angelaki, September 2016, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/0969725x.2016.1229444.
You can read the full text:
Contributors
The following have contributed to this page
