What is it about?
This paper addresses the question of why the United States treated Japan and Korea differently in the revisions of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. While altering the power projection theory regarding nuclear proliferation, it explains the two factors for US decision of granting Japan (but not Korea) the rights of reprocessing and uranium enrichment: the alliance management and commercial interests.
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Why is it important?
The alliance management is the ex ante element of the supplier state's calculation of the security outcome of nuclear assistance to its ally. Intra-alliance politics matters for nuclear latency and the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.
Perspectives
It sheds light on that alliance management is the ex ante element of the supplier state's calculation of the security outcome of its nuclear assistance to its ally. And thus it contributes to the alteration of the existing power projection theory on nuclear proliferation.
Sung Chull Kim
Seoul National University
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Endangering alliance or risking proliferation?: US–Japan and US–Korea nuclear energy cooperation agreements, The Pacific Review, February 2017, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1293715.
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