How political institutions contributed to the rise of Slobodan Milošević to power (in Yugoslavia)

What is it about?

The consensus among specialists on the politics of socialist Yugoslavia and supporters of Slobodan Milosevic is that he rose personally as the leader due to a broad appeal of his political programme. According to one version of the political programme thesis, Milosevic overwhelmed his initially more powerful opponents in the leadership of Serbia in 1987 by obtaining majority support in higher ranks of the party for his nationalist programme, namely the reduction of autonomy of Kosovo. The other version of the thesis says that he extended nationalist appeals to the population at large and established control over party and state organs in the largest republic of federal Yugoslavia largely by bringing pressure from society on the political elite. In any case, Milosevic emerged from the leadership struggle as a very powerful leader and was thus able to purge his rivals from the regional leadership and embark upon the implementation of a nationalist programme. The supporters of Milosevic have largely agreed with the specialists. Borisav Jovic, his right-hand man, claimed, “the removal of bureaucratic leadership of Serbia, which had subserviently accepted the division of Serbia in three parts,” to be one of their main achievements. However, drawing on previously unavailable sources, I have found that the rise of Milosevic was an episode in normal power politics in a socialist party-state. The change of political generations set the stage for leadership struggle, as members of the old guard in the leadership of Serbia gradually left space for younger politicians. In the aftermath of generational change, the core leadership shared views on key issues of policy. Minor disagreements over policy details towards Kosovo were exaggerated in the heat of the power struggle between factions based on personalist networks of Milosevic and his rival, Ivan Stambolic. The appeal of Milosevic to party officials was based on his personal qualities, while the outcome of the power struggle was largely decided by institutional power, on the model of the earlier ascent of Ivan Stambolic. The strategic position of President of the regional party Presidium, at the time not necessarily an office occupied by the most powerful regional politicians in socialist Yugoslavia, granted Milosevic an opportunity to build up political support in high party organs and exploit the party’s organisational resources to challenge successfully his former political protector. The whole episode was essentially about who would be the leader, a typical internal party affair that unfolded according to the rules of the game in socialist party-states, without much influence from society. The case study demonstrates the central role of political institutions in determining political outcomes in socialist party-states as well as important differences between the Soviet and Yugoslav models. The rise of Milosevic personally as the leader in 1986–1987 should be seen analytically as separate from the formation of new power structure in Serbia and the spread of nationalism, the processes that unfolded in response to the pressures from society in 1988–1989.

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