What is it about?

In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates’ daimonion in The Concept of Irony should be read in light of his notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety, and vice versa. Whereas the first should primarily be seen as an exemplification of philosophical transcendental consciousness, the second assumes a more strictly ‘moral’ connotation (‘anxiety about the good’). If the notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety draws upon the Socratic daimonion in The Concept of Irony, this will have implications for philosophy and science in so far as they take a transcendental consciousness for granted. However, Kierkegaard’s continued reference to, if not identification with, Socrates, prevents us from immobilising Kierkegaard’s ‘own’ philosophy, as though the Socratic position can ever be definitively overcome. The ‘enclosed reserve’ of the demonic is rather philosophy’s weak spot.

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Why is it important?

My article takes advantage of the original Danish text to highlight elements that get lost in translations. Next, it offers a cross-reading of an important motif (the demonic) in Kierkegaard's two "Concept" (Begrebet) books: The Concept of Irony and The Concept of Anxiety. Thirdly, it aims at addressing a general critique of the so-called transcendental consciousness in science and philosophy, which pretends to be a-historical but which is in fact unethical.

Perspectives

My article roots in a BA class I gave at Leiden University in 2017 on Socrates interpretations in modern philosophy (Kierkegaard, Hegel, Strauss, Derrida).

Rico Sneller
Universiteit Leiden

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This page is a summary of: Kierkegaard on Socrates’ daimonion, International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, August 2019, Taylor & Francis,
DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602.
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