On ‘Fideism’ as an Interpretive Category

What is it about?

Chapter 5: “On ‘Fideism’ as an Interpretive Category” considers the adequacy of “fideism” for approaching Wittgenstein through comparisons with analyses of James and Kierkegaard. What emerges from this historical study of reception and interpretation is that the meaning of this critical term has continued to shift through twentieth century philosophical scholarship, and thus the question of whether or not any particular philosopher is a fideist is not straightforward. While a narrative may be traced showing threads of late nineteenth century French Protestant fideism in James’s writings, connections with Kierkegaard and various traditions of fideism remain speculative and liable to introduce more misunderstanding than clarity. Unless narrowly circumscribed, use of the term “fideism” in interpreting Wittgenstein is likely to introduce more confusion than insight.

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