What is it about?
This paper proposes the optimal bidding of a price-maker energy hub. It employs game theory for optimal bidding strategy in a competitive and equilibrium market. The high flexibility of the energy hub helps it to make a profit from participation in the energy market. The strategy is that the proposed energy hub maximizes its profit with the presence of other rival energy hubs. There are price uncertainties modeled by the Monte-Carlo simulation. Incomplete information in the competitive market is modeled by the game theory, which causes the problem to be stochastic and equilibrium programming. The proposed solution for this problem uses stochastic bi-level programming.
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Why is it important?
We think of its importance since the paper uses some new points including: • A model is presented for a price maker energy hub in a competitive energy market • Energy hub uses game theory for optimal bidding submission • There are rival energy hubs bidding in energy market • There are price uncertainties and incomplete information • The proposed solution is stochastic bi-level programming
Perspectives
Working on this paper guided me through familiarizing with concepts I have always liked to gather them in one manuscript: game theory, optimal bidding strategy, energy hub, and stochastic bi-level programming. This article also lead to a newer step in energy hub operation in energy market; the concept may draw lots of attention in nowadays modern power systems.
Mr Ahmad Heidari
Missouri University of Science and Technology
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Equilibrium state of a price-maker energy hub in a competitive market with price uncertainties, IET Renewable Power Generation, January 2020, the Institution of Engineering and Technology (the IET),
DOI: 10.1049/iet-rpg.2019.0958.
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