What is it about?
This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation (sect. 1); it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice (sect. 2) and that a concern for one’s own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one’s community, can be epistemically virtuous (sect. 3); it explains two vices regarding these concerns for one’s own intellectual reputation and desire for esteem: intellectual vanity and intellectual timidity (sect. 4); finally (sect. 5), it offers an account of some of the epistemic harms caused by these vices.
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Why is it important?
It helps people realise that caring about what others think of oneself is not always an unimpressive feature.
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, November 2018, Cambridge University Press,
DOI: 10.1017/s1358246118000541.
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