What is it about?
Western intelligence in and around 1950s gave reason to fear further Soviet-led or inspired aggression, especially against Yugoslavia, but - it was estimated - also against a number of other hot spots such as Iran, Turkey, West Berlin. This tied in withe the policies adopted by the US with NSC 68 of 1950 and later by NATO with the very ambitious Lisbon Force Goals of 1952
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Why is it important?
It has long been argued that the US policy document NSC 68 was absurd and a mad over-reaction. In the light of the intelligence reports - some well founded as we now know - coming in at the time, NSC 68 looks much more reasonable as reaction.
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This page is a summary of: NSC 68 and the Soviet threat: a new perspective on Western threat perception and policy making, Review of International Studies, January 1991, Cambridge University Press,
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210500112306.
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