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We suggest that institutional settings provide incentives for political parties to eld incumbent candidates strategically, depending on district size; and high levels of party system instability in consolidating democracies create conditions under which political parties bene t more from the incumbents' reputations. By using a new dataset, we test whether the incumbency advantage exists, and depends on the district size and the level of political instability in Turkey. Our results indicate that the incumbency advantage in Turkey is largely conditional on the district size. The e ffect of the party system instability is also substantial. The higher the party system instability, the more political parties benefi t from fi elding incumbents in party lists.

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This page is a summary of: Bringing the incumbency advantage into question for proportional representation, Electoral Studies, December 2015, Elsevier,
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2015.06.007.
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