What is it about?
We consider the modern methods of stimulating the usersof electricity to load leveling during the day, in particular, through the formation of price-dependent demand. The article proposes an incentive pricing mechanism based on game-theoretic approaches to modeling the behavior of participants in the electric retail market. It has stimulating properties for shifting load from peak zones. The effectiveness of this pricing mechanism is demonstrated in the example of a small electric power system using real consumption.
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This page is a summary of: Mechanism design of incentive retail electricity prices, IFAC-PapersOnLine, January 2022, Elsevier,
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2022.07.062.
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