What is it about?
The water demand in the upstream and downstream of a transboundary river basin varies based on the water use by the irrigation projects, dam, hydroelectricity, ecosystem, livelihood practices and household activities of the people. The study considered the case of Teesta river basin and estimates the water demand of upstream, downstream region as well as entire Teesta river basin shared by India and Bangladesh. The water productivity method exercised in the study demonstrates that 2648 and 1971 cumec water is required to fulfill the irrigation demand of command and irrigable areas, respectively, of entire Teesta basin throughout the year against 198, 1472, 793 cumec water discharge in dry, monsoon and lean season. Although there is a substantial water demand for the hydropower projects in the upstream, it is appeared that water required only by the upstream irrigation project is beyond the water supply capacity of the Trans-Himalayan river Teesta during dry and lean season. This may underpin the shortage of water in the lower riparian country, which fuels the zero-sum game in the river basin, where one player is affected by the intervention of the another player. The result from this analysis with zero-sum game perspective may be useful for reviewing transboundary water policies, basin management and development, sustainable water resource management and water sharing mechanism among countries in the transboundary river basin
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Why is it important?
The study aims to estimate agricultural water demand and availability of water in the Teesta basin riparian countries and evaluate the water resources against the water demand condition. The study also examined the ecosystem case of the river due to water withdrawal for the agriculture and hydropower purpose from the context of zero-sum game. Finally, the study seeks how the water and river basin management of other Asian transboundary rivers basin is functioning for conflict minimization and socioeconomic gain optimization, and assesses the context of zero-sum game along with the case of Teesta.
Perspectives
In order to lessen water inequality and conflict, protect the river ecosystem, biodiversity, traditional values and culture, and ensure the livelihood options of the river-dependent communities, cooperative game is the much better option compared to the zero-sum game. A long-lasting theory of zero-sum games practiced in the transboundary basin Teesta will jeopardize regional prosperity between India and Bangladesh. Irreversible environmental effect is also anticipated to be taking place in the water-scarce downstream region as well, whereas avoiding non-cooperative game and adopting water cooperation between the two close neighbors can gift mutually beneficial prospects such as ecotourism, power trade, knowledge sharing, technology transfer, water connectivity, joint disaster management, environmental protection, blue peace, and water security as well.
Mr Md. Arfanuzzaman
Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Water demand and ecosystem nexus in the transboundary river basin: a zero-sum game, Environment Development and Sustainability, January 2017, Springer Science + Business Media,
DOI: 10.1007/s10668-017-9915-y.
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