What is it about?
Environmental ethics is often framed as objecting to an anthropocentric point of view. It equalizes the functional role of human and non-human in the eco-system. But, I argue, no organism is fully explained by its function or role in the system; rather, the organism is a historical fact that has proved viable in that eco-system, in a synthesis of evolutionary biology and human history. Environmental degradation results from pitting 'man' against nature but this can be contrasted with the African traditional idea of 'vital force' running through natural and social reality. Human subjectivity is not, pace Thomas Nagel, confined to a species perspective but there is a supra-biological patterning of experience intending understanding and true value. The development of these powers of agency is blocked by a view of self-determination as absolute independence from the 'other'. In contrast, again, the African norm of ubuntu places human autonomy as sourced through others.
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Why is it important?
The discussion brings together an African perspective and an Aristotelian/Thomist framework of thinking in order to outline a environmental ethic with cross-cultural appeal. At the same time it offers a way forward that is not subject to the problems of a non-anthropocentric approach in seemingly being self-undermining by precisely addressing the moral consciousness of human persons. Finally, it suggests ways of re-formulating African traditional thought so as to avoid any hint of supernaturalism.
Perspectives
The approach here brings in a new perspective on how we can understand the human organism, one that is non-reductionist and so can dialogue with the pre-modern perspectives of any traditional culture.
Patrick Giddy
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Read the Original
This page is a summary of: Environmental Ethics in the Context of African Traditional Thought: Beyond the Impasse, January 2019, Springer Science + Business Media,
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-18807-8_4.
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