All Stories

  1. Philosophy and Modeling and Simulation
  2. Supporting Science Areas
  3. The received view of framing
  4. Risk as a Consequence
  5. The Subjective Statistician
  6. Models of Decision-Making
  7. Collective Rationality’s Roots
  8. Epistemology of modeling and simulation
  9. Unsharp Sharpness
  10. Condorcet's Jury Theorem
  11. Preference
  12. Models as Partial Explanations
  13. Multi-Attribute Approaches to Risk
  14. Collective acts
  15. Introduction: Interactive Epistemology
  16. Calibration
  17. Philosophical and Epistemological Issues in Simulation and Gaming
  18. The Bayesian Decision-Theoretic Approach to Statistics
  19. Exclusion from the social contract
  20. The Philosophy and Epistemology of Simulation: A Review
  21. Collective Rationality
  22. Rationality
  23. Equilibrium
  24. Compositionality
  25. Implications
  26. Groups
  27. Coordination
  28. Strategy for Coalitions
  29. Illustrations and Comparisons
  30. Rationality Writ Large
  31. Agents and Acts
  32. Games of Strategy
  33. Cooperative Games
  34. Probabilities in Decision Rules
  35. Does collective rationality entail efficiency?
  36. Optimization and improvement
  37. Book ReviewsJosé Luis Bermúdez, . Decision Theory and Rationality .Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 189. $50.00 (cloth).
  38. Introduction
  39. Utility and framing
  40. The contributors
  41. The Explanatory Power of Models and Simulations: A Philosophical Exploration
  42. Labeling Genetically Modified Food
  43. Using Food Labels to Regulate Risks
  44. Utility Maximization Generalized
  45. Initiating Coordination
  46. Collective, universal, and joint rationality
  47. Thinking about Acting: Logical Foundations for Rational Decision Making - by John L. Pollock
  48. Annie Petit (Editor). Auguste Comte: Trajectoires positivistes 1798–1998. (Épistémologie et Philosophie des Sciences.) 438 pp., bibl., index. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2003.
  49. regulation of risks
  50. Realistic Decision Theory
  51. Idealizations
  52. Acceptability's Consequences
  53. Realistic Standards for Decisions
  54. Ideal to Real
  55. Optimizing and Its Offspring
  56. Realism about Agents: Resources
  57. Realism about Agents: Cognitive Limitations
  58. Realism about Agents: Mistakes
  59. Realism about Situations
  60. Applications to Game Theory
  61. Economic Rationality
  62. ECONOMIC RATIONALITY
  63. Belief and Acceptance
  64. From rationality to coordination
  65. Decisions to follow a rule
  66. COMMENTS ON ELLIS’ “WHAT ECONOMISTS (AND EVERYONE ELSE) SHOULD THINK ABOUT UTILITY THEORY”
  67. Book ReviewKen Binmore, . Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract , Volume 2. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998. Pp. xxiii + 589. $50.00 (cloth).
  68. Decision Space
  69. Economic Choice Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior, John H. Kagel, Raymond C. Battalio, and Leonard Green. Cambridge University Press, 1995, xii + 230 pages.
  70. Equilibrium and Rationality
  71. Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, et l'economie politique
  72. Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Jordan Howard Sobel
  73. Adam Morton on Dilemmas
  74. The Hypothesis of Nash Equilibrium and Its Bayesian Justification
  75. Contractiarianism and Bargaining Theory
  76. Group Decisions and Decisions for a Group
  77. CONVENTIONS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
  78. Hierarchical Maximization of Two Kinds of Expected Utility
  79. Trustee decisions in investment and finance
  80. A game-theoretic comparison of the utilitarian and maximin rules of social choice
  81. Mean-risk decision analysis
  82. Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule
  83. Decision instability
  84. Interpersonal utility in principles of social choice
  85. The St. Petersburg gamble and risk
  86. Utility Tempered with Equality
  87. A decision maker's options
  88. Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
  89. Thomas Mark on Works of Virtuosity
  90. A bias of rationality
  91. Theory and Evidence
  92. Conditionalization and Evidence
  93. Decision Theory
  94. Preface
  95. Objective and Methods
  96. Intrinsic Utility Analysis
  97. Expected Utility Analysis
  98. Expected Utility's Promotion
  99. Two-Dimensional Utility Analysis
  100. Group Utility Analysis
  101. Application to Trustee Decisions
  102. Power and Versatility
  103. Appendix: Consistency of Calculations of Utilities
  104. References
  105. Preface
  106. Idealizations
  107. Equilibrium
  108. Strategic Equilibrium
  109. Finding Equilibria
  110. Applications
  111. References
  112. 20. Economic Rationality
  113. Collective Rationality
  114. Preface
  115. Introduction
  116. Separability
  117. Expected utility
  118. Intrinsic utility
  119. Temporal utility
  120. Spatiotemporal utility
  121. Causal utility
  122. Conclusion
  123. References
  124. Games and Solutions
  125. Reasons and Incentives
  126. Other Standards for Solutions