All Stories

  1. Störring and Lindworsky: Two pioneers in the psychology of deductive reasoning.
  2. On trivalent logics, probabilistic weak deduction theorems, and a general import-export principle
  3. Probability propagation rules for Aristotelian syllogisms
  4. On Independence and Compound and Iterated Conditionals
  5. Towards a Conceptual Framework for Conspiracy Theory Theories
  6. Connexive Logic, Probabilistic Default Reasoning, and Compound Conditionals
  7. Probabilistic interpretations of argumentative attacks: Logical and experimental results1
  8. Towards a Conceptual Framework for Conspiracy Theory Theories
  9. Interpreting Connexive Principles in Coherence-Based Probability Logic
  10. Probabilities of conditionals and previsions of iterated conditionals
  11. What Society Can and Cannot Learn From Coherence
  12. Probability Propagation in Selected Aristotelian Syllogisms
  13. Probabilistic inferences from conjoined to iterated conditionals
  14. A process model of the understanding of uncertain conditionals
  15. Probabilistic Semantics for Categorical Syllogisms of Figure II
  16. Probabilistic squares and hexagons of opposition under coherence
  17. Conditionals, Counterfactuals, and Rational Reasoning: An Experimental Study on Basic Principles
  18. Generalized Probabilistic Modus Ponens
  19. Cognition and Natural Disasters: Stimulating an Environmental Historical Debate
  20. Centering and Compound Conditionals Under Coherence
  21. Square of Opposition Under Coherence
  22. Transitivity in coherence-based probability logic
  23. Experimental probabilistic pragmatics beyond Bayes’ theorem
  24. Transitive Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities
  25. Editor's note: Special issue on Combining Probability and Logic to Solve Philosophical Problems
  26. Reasoning About Uncertain Conditionals
  27. Formal Epistemology and the New Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning
  28. Erratum
  29. The new psychology of reasoning: A mental probability logical perspective
  30. Forces of Nature and Cultural Responses
  31. Forces of Nature and Cultural Responses: An Introduction
  32. On Argument Strength
  33. Experiments on Aristotle’s Thesis
  34. Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity
  35. Reporting on historical severe storms: Two examples of Utrecht (1674) and Abtenau (1796)
  36. Probabilistic theories of reasoning need pragmatics too: Modulating relevance in uncertain conditionals
  37. How people interpret conditionals: Shifts toward the conditional event.
  38. The Science of Reason
  39. The conditional in mental probability logic
  40. Framing human inference by coherence based probability logic
  41. Mental probability logic
  42. Coherence and Nonmonotonicity in Human Reasoning
  43. Towards a mental probability logic