All Stories

  1. Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize
  2. Endogenous timing in three-player Tullock contests
  3. Group size and matching protocol in contests
  4. Contests for catch shares
  5. The Political Economy of Attorneys and Human Resources
  6. Contests with multiple alternative prizes: Public-good/bad prizes and externalities
  7. Decisions of Duopoly Firms on Sharing Information on Their Delegation Contracts
  8. Observable versus unobservable R&D investments in duopolies
  9. The effects of conflict budget on the intensity of conflict: an experimental investigation
  10. Asymmetric contests with initial probabilities of winning
  11. Concealment and verification over environmental regulations: a game-theoretic analysis
  12. Contests with Alternative Public-Good Prizes
  13. Endogenous Group Formation in Contests: Unobservable Sharing Rules
  14. Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts
  15. Two-Player Lopsided Contests under Different Timing Assumptions
  16. ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN CONTESTS WITH DELEGATION
  17. DO RENT‐SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?
  18. Variable valuations and voluntarism under group selection: An evolutionary public goods game
  19. Attorneys' Compensation in Litigation with Bilateral Delegation
  20. Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment
  21. Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets
  22. Effort levels in contests
  23. STRATEGIC DECISIONS ON LAWYERS’ COMPENSATION IN CIVIL DISPUTES
  24. Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information
  25. Contingent fees versus legal expenses insurance
  26. Equilibrium Contingent Compensation in Contests with Delegation
  27. Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
  28. The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups
  29. The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups
  30. Two‐Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio‐Form Contest Success Functions
  31. Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize
  32. Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation
  33. Optimal punishment when individuals may learn deviant values
  34. Effort Levels in Contests: The Public-Good Prize Case
  35. RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY
  36. Difference-form contest success functions and effort levels in contests
  37. Delegation in contests
  38. Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes
  39. Contests with spying: Reply
  40. Contests with spying
  41. Horizontal mergers of price-setting firms with sunk capacity costs
  42. Competitive-share group formation in rent-seeking contests
  43. Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players
  44. WINNER‐HELP‐LOSER GROUP FORMATION IN RENT‐SEEKING CONTESTS*
  45. Environmental Conflicts with Reimbursement for Citizen Suits
  46. Effort levels in contests
  47. Favorites and underdogs: Strategic behavior in an experimental contest
  48. Environmental Conflicts and Strategic Commitment
  49. Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets