All Stories

  1. Economic crises and climate action: the enduring role of CBDR
  2. Protecting Future Generations Through Minilateralism: Climate Clubs and Normative Legitimacy
  3. Economic recessions and decarbonisation: analysing green stimulus spending in Canada and the US
  4. The Paris Agreement’s inherent tension between ambition and compliance
  5. Screening or constraining? The relationship between participation and target achievement in transboundary air pollution treaties
  6. How US withdrawal might influence cooperation under the Paris climate agreement
  7. Would my driving pattern change if my neighbor were to buy an emission-free car?
  8. The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation? – ERRATUM
  9. Institutional and environmental effectiveness: Will the Paris Agreement work?
  10. Would My Driving Pattern Change If My Neighbor Were to Buy an Emission-Free Car?
  11. The effectiveness of climate clubs under Donald Trump
  12. Climate leadership by conditional commitments
  13. The Club Approach: A Gateway to Effective Climate Co-operation?
  14. Why the United States Supports International Enforcement for Some Treaties but not for Others
  15. Editorial to the Issue on Climate Governance and the Paris Agreement
  16. The Paris Agreement: Short-Term and Long-Term Effectiveness
  17. When Does Informal Enforcement Work?
  18. Climate change mitigation: a role for climate clubs?
  19. Regulating Solar Radiation Management
  20. Why no twin-track Europe? Unity, discontent, and differentiation in European integration
  21. Hope or Despair? Formal Models of Climate Cooperation
  22. Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
  23. Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence
  24. Self-Enforcing Peace and Environmental Agreements: Toward Scholarly Cross-Fertilization?1
  25. A credible compliance enforcement system for the climate regime
  26. US presidents and the failure to ratify multilateral environmental agreements
  27. Can conditional commitments break the climate change negotiations deadlock?
  28. Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics
  29. Why the United States did not become a party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US perspectives
  30. Emission trading: Participation enforcement determines the need for compliance enforcement
  31. Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy
  32. A climate agreement with full participation
  33. Which Way to U.S. Climate Cooperation? Issue Linkage versus a U.S.‐Based Agreement
  34. Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: can punitive consequences restore compliance?
  35. The United States and international climate cooperation: International “pull” versus domestic “push”
  36. The price of non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol: The remarkable case of Norway
  37. Preface
  38. The Limits of the Law of the Least Ambitious Program
  39. Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance
  40. The nature, origin and impact of legally binding consequences: the case of the climate regime
  41. Regional versus global cooperation for climate control
  42. When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?
  43. Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh Accords
  44. Promoting cooperation through institutional design
  45. The Evolution of Cooperation: Some Notes on the Importance of Discrimination
  46. Review Essay : Probabilistic Behavior and Non-Myopic Equilibria in Superpower Games
  47. The Contradictions of Rational Abstention: Counterfinality, Voting, and Games without a Solution*
  48. Binary Games as Models of Public Goods Provision*
  49. Hegemonic Decline and the Possibility of International Cooperation: Comments on Duncan Snidal's 'The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory'