All Stories

  1. Correlates of the (soft) skills of Italian undergraduate students
  2. The Effects of Physical Activity on Social Interactions: The Case of Trust and Trustworthiness
  3. CURRENT MACROECONOMIC CHALLENGES
  4. OPTIMAL INFLATION TARGETING RULE UNDER POSITIVE HAZARD FUNCTIONS FOR PRICE CHANGES
  5. Trend inflation, the labor market wedge, and the non-vertical Phillips curve
  6. Theory and Practice of Contagion in Monetary Unions: Domino Effects in EMU Mediterranean Countries
  7. U.S. TREND INFLATION REINTERPRETED: THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICIES AND TIME-VARYING NOMINAL RIGIDITIES
  8. Oil Price Fluctuations and it Impact on Economic Growth: A Dsge Approach.
  9. Yoga Beyond Wellness: Meditation, Trust and Cooperation
  10. Central Banks and Economic Policy after the Crisis: What Have We Learned?
  11. Inflation targets and endogenous wage markups in a New Keynesian model
  12. A general theory of controllability and expectations anchoring for small-open economies
  13. Trend inflation as a workers’ discipline device
  14. Expectations Dynamics: Policy, Announcements and Limits to Dynamic Inconsistency
  15. The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context
  16. THE COST OF SOCIAL PACTS
  17. Tinbergen controllability and -player LQ-games
  18. Monetary policy, rule-of-thumb consumers and external habits: a G7 comparison
  19. Fiscal and monetary interaction under monetary policy uncertainty
  20. FISCAL POLICY UNDER BALANCED BUDGET AND INDETERMINACY: A NEW KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE
  21. Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations
  22. The old and the new theory of economic policy
  23. Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games
  24. The macroeconomics of social pacts
  25. Is there any scope for corporatism in macroeconomic policies?
  26. Policy uncertainty, symbiosis, and the optimal fiscal and monetary conservativeness
  27. Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis
  28. Labor market regimes and the effects of monetary policy
  29. Towards a New Theory of Economic Policy: Continuity and Innovation
  30. Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union
  31. Effectiveness of monetary policy and limited asset market participation: Neoclassical versus Keynesian effects
  32. UNIONS, FISCAL POLICY AND CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY*
  33. Fiscal Leadership and Coordination in the EMU
  34. IS CORPORATISM FEASIBLE?
  35. DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU
  36. From First- to Second-Generation Social Pacts
  37. Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union
  38. MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS
  39. The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union
  40. Staying together or breaking apart: policy-makers’ endogenous coalitions formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union
  41. Endogenous Coalition Formation Concepts
  42. International Policy Coordination
  43. Accession to a Monetary Union
  44. The Basic Symmetric Two-Country Model
  45. Concluding Remarks
  46. Unions’ inflation aversion and international competitiveness
  47. Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games
  48. Policymakers’ Coalitions and Stabilization Policies in the EMU
  49. Is Corporatism Feasible?
  50. Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
  51. Fiscal and Monetary Interaction Under Monetary Policy Uncertainty
  52. Conflicts and coordination among groups
  53. Announcements as a coordination mechanism
  54. Is there any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies?
  55. Efficacy of Monetary Policy and Limited Asset Market Participation: Neoclassical vs. Keynesian Effects
  56. Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping Targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy
  57. Monetary Conservatism and Fiscal Coordination in a Monetary Union
  58. Monetary Policy Under Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and External Habits: An International Empirical Comparison
  59. Taylor Rule Under Rule-of-Thumb Consumers and External Habits: An International Comparison
  60. Interlocking Directorates as a Trust Substitute: The Italian Non-Life Insurance Industry
  61. Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?
  62. The Issue of Instability in a Simple Policy Game Between the Central Bank and a Representative Union
  63. Preface
  64. Common symbols
  65. An overview
  66. Statics
  67. Dynamics
  68. The Lucas critique
  69. Policy games
  70. A theory of strategic conflict
  71. Controllability in a strategic dynamic setting
  72. From individual players to system controllability
  73. Credibility, dynamic controllability and rational expectations
  74. Dynamic policy games with rational expectations
  75. Expectations and target coordination
  76. A summary and round-up of the conclusions
  77. References
  78. Interlocking Directorates as a Trust Substitute: The Case of the Italian Non-Life Insurance Industry
  79. The Comeback of Inflation as an Optimal Public Finance Tool
  80. A Multi-Country Closed-Economy MU Model
  81. Mathematical Background
  82. World-wide Regional Policy Coordination
  83. An MU Model with Active Monetary Policy
  84. Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-Makers' Endogenous Coalition Formation in the European Economic and Monetary Union