All Stories

  1. Implicit and explicit norms and tools of safety net management
  2. Regulation and Supervision
  3. Deposit Insurance Database
  4. revolving door in banking
  5. Deposit Insurance Database
  6. Deposit Insurance Database
  7. Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central Bank Policymaking
  8. Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the US and EU before and during the great recession
  9. Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross‐Border Banking Mergers within the EU
  10. Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2013
  11. How to Reform the Credit-Rating Process to Support a Sustainable Revival of Private-Label Securitization
  12. Missing elements in US financial reform: A Kübler-Ross interpretation of the inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act
  13. Regulation and Supervision
  14. Safety‐Net Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions
  15. Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession
  16. Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets
  17. Making Safety-Net Managers Accountable for Safety-Net Subsidies
  18. Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk
  19. The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation
  20. Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk
  21. The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation
  22. Banking and Capital Markets
  23. Evidence of Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Mergers of Banks in the EU
  24. Extracting Nontransparent Safety Net Subsidies by Strategically Expanding and Contracting a Financial Institution’s Accounting Balance Sheet
  25. Ethical Failures in Regulating and Supervising the Pursuit of Safety-Net Subsidies
  26. Financial safety nets: Why Do They keep expanding?
  27. Financial Economists Roundtable Statement on Reforming the Role of the Rating “Agencies” in the Securitization Process
  28. Incentive Conflict in Central Bank Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries
  29. Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA
  30. The 2007 Meltdown In Structured Securitization: Searching For Lessons, Not Scapegoats
  31. Deposit Insurance around the World
  32. Adoption and Design of Deposit Insurance
  33. Deposit Insurance Design and Implementation: Policy Lessons from Research and Practice
  34. Determinants of deposit-insurance adoption and design
  35. Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries
  36. Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Perspective
  37. Evidence of Differences in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries
  38. Connecting National Safety Nets: The Dialectics of the Basel II Contracting Process
  39. Incentive Conflict In Central-Bank Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries
  40. Basel II: A Contracting Perspective
  41. Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design
  42. Inadequacy of nation-based and VaR-based safety nets in the European Union
  43. Basel II: A Contracting Perspective
  44. Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements
  45. Deposit Insurance Design And Implementation : Policy Lessons From Research And Practice
  46. Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?
  47. Inadequacy of Nation-Based and VaR-Based Safety Nets in the European Union
  48. Determinants Of Deposit-Insurance Adoption And Design
  49. How Have Borrowers Fared in Banking Megamergers?
  50. Confronting Divergent Interests in Cross-Country Regulatory Arrangements
  51. Can the European Community Afford to Neglect the Need for More Accountable Safety-Net Management?
  52. Impediments to Fair and Efficient Resolution of Large Banks and Banking Crises
  53. Winners and Losers from Enacting the Financial Modernization Statute
  54. Charles Kindleberger: An Impressionist in a Minimalist World
  55. Discussion of shadow reports
  56. Charles Kindleberger
  57. Alternatives to blanket guarantees for containing a systemic crisis
  58. Continuing dangers of disinformation in corporate accounting reports
  59. What kind of multinational deposit-insurance arrangements might best enhance world welfare?
  60. How Have Borrowers Fared in Banking Mega-Mergers?
  61. Continuing Dangers of Disinformation in Corporate Accounting Reports
  62. How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting
  63. Using deferred compensation to strengthen the ethics of financial regulation
  64. Event-study evidence of the value of relaxing long-standing regulatory restraints on banks, 1970–2000
  65. Resolving systemic financial crises efficiently
  66. Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?
  67. Cross-country evidence on deposit-insurance
  68. Regression evidence of safety-net support in Canada and the U.S., 1893–1992
  69. Event-Study Evidence of the Value of Relaxing Longstanding Regulatory Restraints on Banks, 1970-2000
  70. Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does it Work?
  71. Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?
  72. Using disaster planning to optimize expenditures on financial safety nets
  73. Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor
  74. Dynamic inconsistency of capital forbearance: Long-run vs. short-run effects of too-big-to-fail policymaking
  75. Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethicsof Financial Regulation
  76. Financial Safety Nets: Reconstructing and Modeling a Policymaking Metaphor
  77. Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor
  78. Relevance and Need for International Regulatory Standards
  79. Bank Runs and Banking Policies: Lessons for African Policymakers
  80. Designing Financial Safety Nets to Fit Country Circumstances
  81. Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?
  82. The dialectical role of information and disinformation in regulation-induced banking crises
  83. Capital movements, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis
  84. Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994
  85. Capital Movements, Banking Insolvency, and Silent Runs in the Asian Financial Crisis
  86. How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistance by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators
  87. Breakdown of accounting controls at Barings and Daiwa: Benefits of using opportunity-cost measures for trading activity
  88. How Offshore Financial Competition Disciplines Exit Resistence by Incentive-Conflicted Bank Regulators
  89. Implications of superhero metaphors for the issue of banking powers
  90. Covering Up Trading Losses: Opportunity-Cost Accounting as an Internal Control Mechanism
  91. Lessons of privatization
  92. A Contracting-Theory Interpretation of the Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance
  93. Capital Movements, Asset Values, and Banking Policy in Globalized Markets
  94. A Contracting-Theory Interpretation of the Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance
  95. Making bank risk shifting more transparent
  96. Ethical Foundations of Financial Regulation
  97. ForrestCapie, CharlesGoodhart, StanleyFischer,andNorbertSchnadt,The Future of Central Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England.New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995. xiv + 362 pp., $49.95.
  98. The Evolving U.S. Legislative Agenda in Banking and Finance
  99. Editors’ Note
  100. The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders
  101. Comment on Alternative Monies and the Demand for Media of Exchange
  102. Reducing Taxpayer Exposure to Loss from Innovations in Bank Risk Management
  103. Impact of the Clinton credit availability program on commercial banks (policy paper)
  104. Preface to minisymposium on drawing the right lessons from the S&L mess
  105. Opportunity cost of capital forbearance during the final years of the FSLIC mess
  106. The federal deposit insurance fund that didn't put a bite on U.S. taxpayers
  107. Risk-Shifting by Federally Insured Commercial Banks
  108. De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?
  109. Difficulties in making implicit government risk-bearing partnerships explicit
  110. How much did US taxpayers truly lose in the last few years of the S&L mess.
  111. Difficulties of transferring risk-based capital requirements to developing countries
  112. U.S. Office Market Values During the Past Decade: How Distorted Have Appraisals Been?
  113. Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions
  114. What is the Value-Added for Large U.S. Banks in Offering Mutual Funds?
  115. Book Reviews
  116. Comeback: The Restoration of American Banking Power in the New World Economy.
  117. How Much Did Capital Forbearance Add to the Cost of the S&L Insurance Mess
  118. "The Federal Deposit Insurance Fund That Didn't Put A Bite on U.S. Tax Payers"
  119. Taxpayer Loss Exposure in the Bank Insurance Fund
  120. Long-Run Benefits in Financial Regulation from Increased Accountability and Privatization
  121. What Lessons Should Japan Learn from the U.S. Deposit-Insurance Mess?
  122. Reflexive Adaptation of Business to Regulation and Regulation to Business
  123. Incentive conflict in deposit-institution regulation: evidence from Australia
  124. Taxpayer Loss Exposure in the Bank Insurance Fund
  125. Ambiguity and Government Risk-Bearing for Low-Probability Events
  126. Office Market Values During the Past Decade: How Distorted Have Appraisals Been?
  127. Corporate capital and government guarantees
  128. The savings and loan insurance mess
  129. CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1980s COMMERCIAL CONSTRUCTION BOOM
  130. Government Officials as a Source of Systemic Risk in International Financial Markets
  131. Tension between Competition and Coordination in International Financial Regulation
  132. Tension Between Competition and Coordination in International Financial Regulation
  133. Bureaucratic self-interest as an obstacle to monetary reform
  134. Capital Positions of Japanese Banks
  135. Principal‐Agent Problems in S&L Salvage
  136. Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage
  137. Incentive Conflict in the International Regulatory Agreement on Risk-Based Analysis
  138. Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms
  139. Defective Regulatory Incentives and the Bush Initiative
  140. The Need for Timely and Accurate Measures of Federal Deposit Insurers’ Net Reserve Position
  141. The High Cost of Incompletely Funding the FSLIC Shortage of Explicit Capital
  142. The Bush Plan Is No Cure for the S&L Insurance Malady
  143. Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators
  144. How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit-Insurance Funds Fail
  145. Modeling Structural and Temporal Variation in the Market's Valuation of Banking Firms
  146. Change in market assessments of deposit-institution riskiness
  147. Change in Market Assessments of Deposit-Institution Riskiness
  148. THE IMPACT OF A NEW FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN
  149. Banking Policy and Structure: A Comparative Analysis
  150. No room for weak links in the chain of deposit-insurance reform
  151. No Room for Weak Links in the Chain of Deposit Insurance Reform
  152. Who Should Learn What From the Failure and Delayed Bailout of the ODGF?
  153. DANGERS OF CAPITAL FORBEARANCE: THE CASE OF THE FSLIC AND “ZOMBIE” S&Ls
  154. The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance
  155. Appearance and reality in deposit insurance
  156. Politics and Fed Policymaking: The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same
  157. Change and Progress in Contemporary Mortgage Markets
  158. Regulatory structure in futures markets: Jurisdictional competition between the sec, the cftc, and other agencies
  159. Technological and Regulatory Forces in the Developing Fusion of Financial‐Services Competition
  160. Technological and Regulatory Forces in the Developing Fusion of Financial- Services Competition
  161. Microeconomic Evidence on the Composition of Effective Household SavingsDuring the 1960s and 1970s
  162. Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition Among the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies
  163. Technological and Regulatory Forces in the Developing Fusion of Financial-Services Competition
  164. Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Origins of Financial Innovation
  165. Competition and Regulation in Financial Markets Albert Verheirstraeten
  166. Nested Tests of Alternative Term-Structure Theories
  167. Rejoinder
  168. Changes in the provision of correspondent-banking services and the role of Federal Reserve Banks under the DIDMC Act
  169. Changes in the Provision of Correspondent-Banking Services and the Role of Federal Reserve Banks under the DIDMC Act
  170. Why financial regulations never work as advertised.
  171. Why do central-bank toolkits keep evolving?
  172. Nested Tests of Alternative Term-Structure Theories
  173. Accelerating Inflation, Technological Innovation, and the Decreasing Effectiveness of Banking Regulation
  174. Deregulation, Savings and Loan Diversification, and the Flow of Housing Finance
  175. Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital*
  176. Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital
  177. Market Incompleteness and Divergences Between Forward and Futures Interest Rates
  178. Market Incompleteness and Divergences Between Forward and Futures Interest Rates*
  179. Analysis of the Impact of Capital-Specific Policies or Legislation and An Integrated Model of Household Flow-of-Funds Allocations: Comment
  180. Accelerating Inflation and the Distribution of Household Savings Incentives
  181. Politics and Fed policymaking
  182. Portfolio Diversification at Commercial Banks
  183. Portfolio Diversification at Commercial Banks
  184. FEDERAL RESERVE MEMBERSHIP ISSUES
  185. Discussion: Duration and Portfolio Strategy
  186. Getting Along Without Regulation Q: Testing the Standard View of Deposit- Rate Competition During the "Wild-Card Experience"
  187. GETTING ALONG WITHOUT REGULATION Q: TESTING THE STANDARD VIEW OF DEPOSIT‐RATE COMPETITION DURING THE “WILD‐CARD EXPERIENCE”*
  188. Good Intentions and Unintended Evil: The Case Against Selective Credit Allocation
  189. Panel Discussion on the Teaching of Money and Banking
  190. Autoregressive and Nonautoregressive Elements in Cross-Section Forecasts of Inflation
  191. Federal Home Loan Bank Board policy and the plight of savings and loan associations: A comment on the Jaffee and Swan papers
  192. New Congressional Restraints and Federal Reserve Independence
  193. The Dollar Barons.
  194. Tax avoidance by savings-and-loan associations before and after the tax reform act of 1969
  195. Theory of Demand: Real and Monetary.
  196. The Re-Politicization of the Fed
  197. The Central Bank As Big Brother: Comment
  198. The Rasche and Andersen Papers: Comment
  199. Monetary and Fiscal Influence on U. S. Money Income, 1891-1970: Comment
  200. Toward a More Viable Financial System: Recommendations of a Special Committee of The American Bankers Association Submitted to The Presidential Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation.
  201. Empirical Econometrics
  202. Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: A General Single-Period Theory of Asset Selection and Capital-Market Equilibrium.
  203. The Future of Thrift Institutions: A Study of Diversification versus Specialization.
  204. Short-Changing the Small Saver: Federal Government Discrimination Against Small Savers During the Vietnam War: Comment
  205. THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES: AN ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE TEACHING WITH PRACTICE
  206. The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Attempt to Reconcile Teaching with Practice
  207. Tax Reform Act of 1969: A Consideration of Provisions Affecting Commercial Banks.
  208. Expectations and Interest Rates: A Cross-sectional Test of the Error-learning Hypothesis
  209. Critical Essays in Monetary Theory
  210. The Determinants of Member-Bank Borrowing: A Reply
  211. THE DETERMINANTS OF MEMBER‐BANK BORROWING: A REPLY*
  212. Book Reviews
  213. Absence of Money Illusion: A Sine Qua Non for Neutral Money?
  214. The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Analysis of a Survey of Interest-Rate Expectations
  215. The Determinants of Member-Bank Borrwing: An Econometric Study
  216. THE DETERMINANTS OF MEMBER‐BANK BORROWING: AN ECONOMETRIC STUDY*
  217. PARETO OPTIMALITY AND THE CHURCH AS AN ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE
  218. INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY: A PROBABILISTIC APPROACH
  219. Bank Portfolio Allocation, Deposit Variability, and the Availability Doctrine
  220. Money as a weighted aggregate
  221. Welfare Economics and Equity: Panel Discussion
  222. Justice and Welfare Economics: A Slightly Mathematical Approach
  223. AGGREGATING STATE DATA BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT: DISTRICT PER CAPITA INCOMES, 1950–1960†
  224. The Use of Monetary Policy: Comment
  225. Book Reviews
  226. The Interregional Flow of Funds in the United States, 1955-58
  227. THE INTERREGIONAL FLOW OF FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955–58*
  228. The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking
  229. Charles Kindleberger: An Impressionist in a Minimalist World
  230. Redefining and Containing Systemic Risk
  231. Unmet Duties in Managing Financial Safety Nets
  232. The Inevitability of Shadowy Banking
  233. Regulation and Supervision: An Ethical Approach
  234. Ethical Failures in Regulating and Supervising: The Pursuit of Safety Net Subsidies
  235. Hair of the Dog that Bit Us: The Insufficiency of New and Improved Capital Requirements
  236. Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design
  237. How Have Borrowers Fared in Banking Mega-Mergers?
  238. Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central-Bank Policymaking
  239. Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Banking Mergers within the EU
  240. The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation
  241. The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons not Scapegoats
  242. Systemic Risk of Us Banks in the Period 1974-2010
  243. The Importance of Monitoring and Mitigating the Safety-Net Consequences of Regulation-Induced Innovation
  244. Missing Elements in U.S. Financial Reform: A Kubler-Ross Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act
  245. Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2010
  246. Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?
  247. Event-Study Evidence of the Value of Relaxing Longstanding Regulatory Restraints on Banks, 1970-2000
  248. How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting
  249. Variation in Systemic Risk at US Banks During 1974-2010
  250. IMPACT OF DIFFERENTIAL AND DOUBLE TAXATION ON CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICIES IN AN INFLATIONARY WORLD
  251. Ethical Failures in Regulating and Supervising the Pursuit of Safety Net Subsidies
  252. Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-And-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession
  253. Safety-Net Benefits Conferred on Difficult-to-Fail-and-Unwind Banks in the US and EU Before and During the Great Recession
  254. What Lessons Might Crisis Countries in Asia and Latin America Have Learned from the Savings and Loan Mess?
  255. Unpacking and Reorienting the Executive Subcultures of Megabanks and Their Regulators
  256. Evidence of Improved Monitoring and Insolvency Resolution after FDICIA
  257. Chapter 11 The Expanding Financial Safety Net: The Dodd-Frank Act as an Exercise in Denial and Cover-Up
  258. Tracking Variation in Systemic Risk at Us Banks During 1974-2013