All Stories

  1. Two different approaches in cooperative games give - essentially - the same solution
  2. Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks
  3. Bounds on Malapportionment
  4. Key principles in agreement recommendations for games in partition function form
  5. Dominance
  6. Environmental Applications
  7. Femtocell Networks
  8. Further Applications
  9. Implementation of the Core
  10. Oligopoly Models
  11. Other stability concepts
  12. Other values
  13. Partition Function Form Games
  14. Preliminaries
  15. Purpose of the book
  16. Terminology and Notation
  17. The Core
  18. The Shapley-value
  19. How Brexit Affects European Union Power Distribution
  20. Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
  21. Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation
  22. Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
  23. Stable allocations of risk
  24. Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
  25. Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements
  26. The invariant method can be manipulated
  27. Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
  28. Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
  29. The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
  30. Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective
  31. A recursive core for partition function form games
  32. The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
  33. The coalition structure core is accessible
  34. The Core in Normal Form Games
  35. A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
  36. The Core in the Presence of Externalities
  37. The Core of a Partition Function Game