All Stories

  1. Sharing of finite stocks of limited resources is similar to the problem of fair representation
  2. Two different approaches in cooperative games give - essentially - the same solution
  3. Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks
  4. Bounds on Malapportionment
  5. Key principles in agreement recommendations for games in partition function form
  6. Dominance
  7. Environmental Applications
  8. Femtocell Networks
  9. Further Applications
  10. Implementation of the Core
  11. Oligopoly Models
  12. Other stability concepts
  13. Other values
  14. Partition Function Form Games
  15. Preliminaries
  16. Purpose of the book
  17. Terminology and Notation
  18. The Core
  19. The Shapley-value
  20. How Brexit Affects European Union Power Distribution
  21. Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
  22. Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation
  23. Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
  24. Stable allocations of risk
  25. Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
  26. Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements
  27. The invariant method can be manipulated
  28. Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
  29. Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
  30. The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
  31. Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective
  32. A recursive core for partition function form games
  33. The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
  34. The coalition structure core is accessible
  35. The Core in Normal Form Games
  36. A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
  37. The Core in the Presence of Externalities
  38. The Core of a Partition Function Game