All Stories

  1. Competitive Equilibrium and Optimisation Approaches to Apportionment
  2. Sharing of finite stocks of limited resources is similar to the problem of fair representation
  3. Two different approaches in cooperative games give - essentially - the same solution
  4. Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks
  5. Bounds on Malapportionment
  6. Key principles in agreement recommendations for games in partition function form
  7. Dominance
  8. Environmental Applications
  9. Femtocell Networks
  10. Further Applications
  11. Implementation of the Core
  12. Oligopoly Models
  13. Other stability concepts
  14. Other values
  15. Partition Function Form Games
  16. Preliminaries
  17. Purpose of the book
  18. Terminology and Notation
  19. The Core
  20. The Shapley-value
  21. How Brexit Affects European Union Power Distribution
  22. Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
  23. Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation
  24. Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
  25. Stable allocations of risk
  26. Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities
  27. Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements
  28. The invariant method can be manipulated
  29. Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core
  30. Balancedness Conditions for Exact Games
  31. The minimal dominant set is a non-empty core-extension
  32. Coherent measures of risk from a general equilibrium perspective
  33. A recursive core for partition function form games
  34. The core can be accessed with a bounded number of blocks
  35. The coalition structure core is accessible
  36. The Core in Normal Form Games
  37. A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
  38. The Core in the Presence of Externalities
  39. The Core of a Partition Function Game